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Abstract 
This paper analyzes firms’ choices regarding the geographic scope of patent 
protection within the European patent system. We develop an econometric model 
at the patent level to quantify the impact of office fees and translation costs on 
firms’ decision to validate a patent in a particular country once it has been granted 
by the EPO. These costs have been disregarded in previous studies. The results 
suggest that both translation costs and fees for validation and renewals have a 
strong influence on the behavior of applicants. The estimates are then employed to 
simulate the impact of the London Protocol, a recent policy reform which reduces 
translation requirements in the European patent system. National validations of 
patents granted by the EPO are estimated to increase by 29%. 
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1 Introduction 
Recent developments in patenting activity are the subject of a growing literature. Since the 
mid-1990s scholars have focused on various aspects of patenting behavior. One line of 
exploration focuses on the incentives that drive economic agents to rely on the patent system 
(e.g., Cohen et al. 2000, Arundel 2001, Peeters and van Pottelsberghe 2006, Blind et al. 2006 
and von Graevenitz et al. 2008), and on potential implications of their behaviour for the 
effectiveness of the patent system. Another line of research focuses on the filing and drafting 
strategies of applicants when applying for a patent. In this literature, researchers have focused 
on choices regarding the number of claims (van Zeebroeck et al. 2006; Archontopoulos et al. 
2007), the quality of patent drafting (Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe 2007), and the filing 
of multiple patents based on few underlying priority filings, as in the case of divisional 
applications (Harhoff 2006). 
However, in both of these literatures, the determinants of the international scope of patent 
protection have so far been neglected. While geographical scope is frequently used as an 
indicator of patent value (Putnam 1996), its determinants have so far not been identified 
explicitly. To the best of our knowledge, only a few studies have focused on the drivers of 
international patenting. Among them are Bosworth (1984), Eaton and Kortum (1996), Porter 
and Stern (2000), and Eaton et al. (2004). The cost structures considered in these studies have 
been rather simple – for example, none of them have taken into account the role of post-grant 
fees related to the validation of patents in multiple jurisdictions or translation costs as 
potential determinants of the geographical extension of patent protection. Even recent studies 
(e.g., Deng 2007) using a renewal cost approach to identify the value of EPO-granted patents 
have disregarded the issue of translation and validation costs although these can easily be of 
the same order of magnitude as cumulative renewal fees. 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the literature with an in-depth analysis of the 
geographical scope of protection. The European patent system provides an excellent setting 
for understanding the drivers of international patenting strategies, since it imposes rather 
heterogeneous cost regimes on patent applicants. Once a patent is granted by the EPO, the 
applicant has the option, but not the obligation to validate the patent in any of the countries 
for which patent protection was requested. Possibly for each country, the applicant faces a 
one-time validation fee and translation costs if he wishes to validate the grant in the respective 
jurisdiction, and a sequence of country-specific renewal payments thereafter.  
An empirical model of validation behaviour is tested with a unique dataset comprised of all 
patents that were granted by the EPO in 2003. Our multivariate analysis aims at 
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understanding the determinants of patent validation in a given country at the level of 
individual patents. The main advantage of this empirical approach is that it allows quantifying 
the impact of fees and translation costs on the behaviour of applicants, taking the observable 
characteristics of the patent application into account.1 The role of fees in patent systems has 
been neglected in the past, and the role of translation costs is currently the subject of an 
intense debate regarding reforms in the European patent system. The recently ratified London 
Protocol2 which results in drastically reducing previous translation requirements is a key 
element of this debate. Under this reform, translation requirements have been lowered 
significantly, but the impact on the demand for validations has not been quantified in any 
study. This paper develops a framework which allows us to analyze the impact of such reform 
measures in quantitative terms. 
We model an applicant’s decision to seek patent protection for a given patent in one of the 
European Patent Convention (EPC) member states once the grant decision by the EPO has 
been made. Our empirical results suggest that the size and the wealth of the origin and 
destination countries significantly affect the probability to observe a patent validation. These 
determinants reflect the benefits that a particular applicant from one country will enjoy from 
patenting in another EPC country. The geographical distance between countries also plays an 
important role – costs of transportation are still present and limit the benefit of a patent, since 
the world is not “completely flat” (Friedman 2006). The costs of translating EPO-granted 
patents into different European languages and the level of renewal fees affect the probability 
of patent validation negatively. The results support the notion that cost reductions are likely to 
have a strong impact on patent validations within Europe. Policy simulations based on the 
estimated parameters predict a substantial increase in validations as a consequence of reduced 
translation requirements due to the so-called London Protocol.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss the institutional context of 
the European patent system and develop the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the 
data set, the construction of the dependent and explanatory variables and the econometric 
                                            
1
  In a companion paper (Harhoff et al. 2007) we rely on a complementary approach, analyzing the validation 
behaviour at the aggregate level of country-to-country patent flows.  
2
  The London Agreement, which was signed in London in October 2000, aims at reducing the costs for EP 
patents. The Parties to the London Protocol agreed to entirely or largely abolish the requirement for 
translations of the European patent specification. This means that applicants will no longer have to file a 
translation of the specification of a granted patent for each EPC member state in which they want patent 
protection. In EPC member states, which are Party to the London Agreement, patents can be filed in one of 
the three official languages of the EPO (i.e. German, English or French). EPC member states that have not 
yet signed the London Agreement still require a translation of the specification into one of their official 
languages. See http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legislative-initiatives/london-agreement.html (accessed on 
January 4, 2008). 
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framework. Descriptive statistics are discussed in section 4. The results of the multivariate 
tests are presented and interpreted in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Institutional Background and Hypotheses 
The EPO grants patents for each of the signatory or accession states to the European Patent 
Convention (EPC). Currently, 35 states have signed the EPC.3 Applications may be filed 
directly at the EPO (as first filings) or be forwarded to the EPO within the priority year after 
having been filed as a priority application in a national patent office (NPO),4 Then, at the 
latest after one year (under the European Patent Convention5 (EPC)) or 31 months (under the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty6 (PCT)), the application may be transferred to the EPO. 
Historically, the EPO examination process has taken slightly more than 4 years (Harhoff and 
Wagner 2006 and van Zeebroeck 2007b). 
The EPC states in which the applicant would like to receive patent protection have to be 
designated by the applicant. The designation of states is subject to the payment of a 
designation fee. The term for designating EPC member states expires six months after the 
European Patent Bulletin announces the publication of the search report (Article 79 (2) EPC). 
However, contracting states “may be withdrawn at any time up to grant of the European 
patent” (Article 97 (3) EPC).7 Before July 1999, applicants were obliged to pay a designation 
fee for each designated contracting state (Article 2 (2), (3) Rules relating to Fees). In 
December 1998, the EPO amended its “Rules relating to Fees”.8 Effective as of July 1, 1999 
“designation fees being deemed paid for all contracting states upon payment of seven times 
the amount of this fee” (amended Article 2 (3) Rules relating to Fees).9 Thus, with the 
payment of designation fees for seven countries, it became possible to designate all of the 35 
EPC countries. 
                                            
3
   See the Appendix, Table A.1 for a list of signatory and accession countries and the date of entry into the 
European system.  
4
  Cf. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007) and Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe (2007) for an in-depth 
description of the various filing routes which may lead to an application at the EPO.  
5
  The European Patent Convention (EPC) signed in Munich in 1973 is a contract constituting the European 
Patent Organisation and providing an independent legal system under which European patents are to be 
granted. The EPC came into force in 1977 and the European Patent Office (EPO) was founded in the very 
same year. On June 1, 1978, the first European patent application was filed with the EPO. Today, the EPC 
has 35 member states (the Appendix contains a list of the 35 member states (Table A.1)). See 
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/contents.html (accessed on January 4, 2008). 
6
  The Patent Cooperation Treaty was signed in Washington in 1970 and entered into force in 1978. By filing a 
patent application under the PCT, it is possible to obtain protection in up to 138 PCT contracting states (see 
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/treaty/about.htm and http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/coded/info/data/coded/en/ 
gl003819.htm (accessed on January 4, 2008).  
7
  See http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/ar79.html, accessed May 3, 2008. 
8
  See http://www.european-patent-office.org/news/pre_oj/fees_6_99_e.htm, accessed May 3, 2008. 
9
  See http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/A7E3392B2D7E2D7AC125738A003DA6FC/ 
$File/rules_relating_to_fees_071213.pdf, accessed May 3, 2008. 
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The choice of the regional scope of patent protection is effectively made by the applicant once 
the patent has been granted. At that point the applicant must select the EPC countries in which 
he would like to receive patent protection, eventually have the patent translated into the 
official languages of these countries, and pay the validation fees as well as the renewal fees 
for each year of protection.10 The setup is therefore appropriate for assessing the sensitivity of 
applicants to marginal increases of fees and transactions costs. 
In what follows, we take into account the extant analyses of firms’ patenting behavior in order 
to derive hypotheses regarding the potential determinants of the geographical scope chosen by 
firms. One of the early studies on the geographical scope of patent protection is provided by 
Slama (1981). The author investigates the determinants of international patent application 
flows at the country level using German patent application data between 1967 and 1978. 
Results show a positive elasticity of filing flows w.r.t. the GDP of applicant countries. 
Bosworth (1984) uses UK patent data from 1974 to assess the factors influencing the decision 
to transfer technology across borders. The empirical analysis at the firm-level reveals a 
positive relationship between the GDP of the destination country and the decision to apply for 
patent protection in this country. The GDP of a country reflects the size of its economy and 
also its wealth (GDP per capita). The two studies suggest that the GDP of both the applicant’s 
and the target country have a role to play in the validation decision. Once GDP is accounted 
for, Slama (1981) does not find any significant influence of the population of the destination 
and the source country on patent application flows between two countries. Macroeconomic 
studies generally attach great value to the population of country pairs as a factor explaining 
trade flows between countries (e.g., Tinbergen 1962, Geraci and Prewo 1977, and Abrams 
1980). The test performed by Slama (1981) and Bosworth (1984) and the results of the trade 
literature thus lead us to put forward the following hypotheses: 
 
H.1a: The GDP per capita of the destination country (i.e. country in which a patent is to 
be validated) positively influences the probability of a patent validation. 
 
H.1b:  The GDP per capita of the origin country (i.e., the country of residence of the 
applicant) positively influences the probability of a patent validation. 
 
H.2a: The number of inhabitants of the destination country positively influences the 
probability of a patent validation. 
 
                                            
10
    This fragmentation of the European patent system has been criticized for years by the business sector, as it 
induces a high managerial complexity and is associated with relatively high cumulative fees and translation 
costs. Cf. van Pottelsberghe and François (2009) and van Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2008) for simulations of 
total patenting costs in the European patent system. International comparisons show that even after the 
London Agreement the costs of patenting are at least four times higher in Europe than in the US. 
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H.2b: The number of inhabitants of the origin country positively influences the probability 
of a patent validation. 
 
These hypotheses suggest that both the wealth and the size of the origin and the destination 
countries substantially affect the probability of observing a validation of a patent originating 
in a home country in the respective destination country. As a measure of the relative wealth of 
the origin country, we use GDP per capita. Applicants from richer countries have on average 
more income at their disposal to file patents abroad. The wealth of the destination country is 
assumed to attract more validations as demand conditions in the respective market are more 
attractive for firms. The destination country’s population should also positively affect the 
validation behavior as a large market is certainly more attractive than a smaller one, even after 
accounting for GDP per capita. The effect of the size of the applicant’s country (origin 
country) on validations is less straightforward, and possibly negative. Indeed, smaller 
countries (with a smaller domestic market) may be characterized by a higher probability to 
validate patents abroad than larger countries (with large domestic markets). 
So far, little research has been done on the influence of costs and fees on the patenting 
behavior of firms.11 Pakes and Schankerman (1984) and Schankerman and Pakes (1986) have 
shown that renewal decisions are affected by the level of renewal fees. A few other studies 
have investigated the role of patent fees. One of the first studies to analyze the influence of 
non-maintenance patenting costs on the decision to apply for a patent was conducted by van 
Pottelsberghe and François (2009). The authors compare the costs of patenting12 in the US, 
Japanese and European patent systems to assess whether patenting costs have an impact on 
the demand for patents. Results show that in 2003 the costs for a patent designating 13 EPC 
member countries is 4 to 8 times (depending on the duration of patent protection) more 
expensive compared to the US. Taking the number of claims of a patent as well as the market 
size of the selected member states into account, the data provide graphical evidence that the 
demand for patents may be price elastic, i.e., the demand for patents may be partly explained 
by differences in market size and differences in fees, as illustrated by their “3C” index (the 
cost per claim per capita). Further evidence on the role of fees is provided by de Rassenfosse 
                                            
11
  de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2007) investigate the role of priority filing fees at national patent 
offices and van Pottelsberghe and François (2009) compare the fees and translation costs in Japan, the 
United States and Europe. Harhoff et al. (2006) analyse the extent to which fees explain validation flows at 
the country level using a gravity model. de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2008) provide time series 
evidence on the potential impact of cumulated fees at the USPTO, JPO and EPO on the demand for patents. 
All these studies obtain results that suggest that fees influence the patenting behaviour of applicants. 
12
  The following cost categories were taken into account: (1) procedural costs (filing fee, search fee, fees for 
designating states, examination fee, claim tax, renewal fees for the years 3 and 4 after application at the EPO 
and validation costs), (2) estimated translation costs, and (3) estimated costs for external services 
(professional services, attorneys, etc.). 
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and van Pottelsberghe (2007), who show that priority filing fees at national patent offices 
have a negative and significant impact on the number of patent applications. However, the 
demand for first filings at national offices is determined by a rather complex set of factors. An 
alternative and potentially more telling experiment would be to analyse the patents already 
granted by one institution and then analyse in which countries they are then taken for 
validation. The present study pursues this approach and uses the validation phase following 
the EPO grant as the research setting.  
The research design adopted in the present paper allows us to identify the impact of post-grant 
fees and translation costs on the patenting behaviour of applicants. Post-grant fees (i.e., 
translation costs, validation fees and fees for maintaining patent protection for the years 4 to 6 
after application at the EPO) are of particular importance for our analysis, since we assume 
that these costs drive the validation decision of applicants and consequently are important 
determinants of the scope of protection. Moreover, these costs are marginal in the sense that 
at the point of decision-making all examination and application fees are sunk, and the receipt 
of the national patent only depends on the costs considered here. We also take early renewal 
fees into account because they represent the expenses that an applicant has to be ready to pay 
when extending patent protection once the patent has been validated in the respective country. 
We do not model renewal behavior fully, but use the renewal fees requested by the national 
patent offices from years 4 to 6 after the application date at the EPO as a measure of these 
costs.  
Assuming that applicants rationally decide about the regional scope of their patent portfolio, 
the following hypotheses relating to fees, translation and early renewal costs are put forward: 
 
H.3a:  The probability of patent validation in an EPC country decreases with an increase 
in relevant translation costs. 
H.3b: The probability of patent validation in an EPC country decreases with an increase 
in the country-specific validation fees. 
H.3c: The probability of a patent validation in an EPC country decreases with an increase 
in the country-specific early renewal fees. 
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3 Data Source and Sample 
Data about filing and grant dates, the country of origin of the priority filings, the language of 
the official proceedings at the EPO and the technical classification of the patent application 
(IPC classes) were extracted from the EPO’s EPASYS database as of January 15, 2006. Data 
on the lapse of patents into the public domain was obtained from the EPASYS database as of 
December 2006. The data were supplemented with information on renewal payments, which 
were received from the EPO post grant system as of December 2006. The empirical analysis 
relies on 53,904 patents granted in 2003 by the EPO and validated in at least one EPC 
member state. Granted patents which had not been validated in any of the EPC member states 
were excluded from the dataset. 13 
Patent validation – After grant, a European (EP) patent has to be validated in each state for 
which protection is sought, i.e., the patent has to be converted into a bundle of patents having 
the same legal status as patents granted through the national procedures.14 In general, this 
requires the filing of a translation of the patent specification, and the payment of national 
validation or publication fees within a specified term (Art. 65(1) EPC).15 However, a 
validation is also possible without filing a translation in the event the language of the official 
proceedings at the EPO is (one of) the official language(s) of the validation country.16 
Furthermore, payment of a validation fee is not required in some countries, such as 
Switzerland and Belgium. 
The patent validation variable is defined as a dummy variable, taking the value one if a patent 
(granted by the EPO) of applicant country A is validated in country B, and zero otherwise.17 
We infer the validation status from our data, assuming that a patent has been validated in a 
                                            
13
  59,992 patents were granted by the EPO in 2003, but 6,088 (or 10%) were not included in the dataset 
because they had not been validated in any of the EPC countries (the patent was withdrawn by the applicant 
after the decision to grant by the EPO). 
14
  Cf. http://www.epo.org/patents/Grant-procedure/Filing-an-application/European-applications/national-
validation.html (accessed on August 21, 2007). 
15
  Cf. http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar65.html (accessed on August 21, 2007). For a 
detailed description of the EP grant and validation procedure, see Harhoff et al. (2007). 
16
  An EP patent application must be filed in one of the official languages of the EPO, i.e. English, German or 
French, the so called procedural languages. Applications filed in other languages have to be translated into 
one of the three official languages within a term of three months. See http://www.epo.org/patents/Grant-
procedure/Filing-an-application.html (accessed on August 22, 2007). 
17
  The 20 Applicant countries include:: Austria (AT), Australia (AU), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), 
Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), United Kingdom 
(UK), Ireland (IE), Israel (IL), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), Korea (KR), The Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), 
Sweden (SE), USA (US) (selection criteria: minimum of 100 patents granted in 2003). The 17 countries of 
validation include: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Switzerland (CH), Cyprus (CY), Germany (DE), Denmark 
(DK), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), United Kingdom (UK), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), 
Luxembourg (LU), Monaco (MC), The Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), and Sweden (SE). Italy (IT) is not 
included due to the lack of information on validations in Italy. Broad estimates by the EPO suggest that 30 
to 40 percent of the patents granted by the EPO are generally validated in Italy.   
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given country if (i) renewal fees are paid for the patent to the national patent office of the 
country and/or (ii) the patent lapses in the given country. In cases where patents lapsed within 
one year after grant (in all validation countries), the patents were considered as lapsed ab 
initio and were removed from the dataset. This is equivalent to assuming that these patents 
had never been validated in any country.18 
GDP per capita and population - Annual data on GDP in current prices (US dollars in 
billions) and the population of the different countries in million capita were obtained from the 
World Economic Outlook Database as of September 2006. The data are published by the 
International Monetary Fund.19 GDP per capita is taken as a proxy for the wealth of a country. 
The population variable is used as a proxy for the market size of a country. 
Physical distance between capital cities - The physical distance between the capital cities of 
the applicant and the validation country was provided by Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 
Department of Government, University of Essex.20  
EPC membership duration (validation country) - The average number of years of EPC 
membership of the validation countries was obtained from the homepage of the EPO.21 The 
variable is included in the regression to test whether the duration of EPC membership reflects 
learning effects. As the transfer rate of domestic priority filings to the EPO increases with 
EPC membership (de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe, 2007), one may expect that this 
duration also affects the probability that a patent is validated in a particular country.  
Region of the applicant - Four dummy variables characterize the location of the applicants’ 
home countries:   
• US applicant 
• Japanese applicant 
• other non-European applicant: AU, CA, IL, KR 
• European applicant: AT, BE, CH, DE, FR, GB, IE, NL, DK, FI, NO, SE, ES, IT 
 
The latter forms the reference group. These regional dummies are used as additional variables 
to account for unobserved heterogeneity between applicants from these country groups. 
Number of claims at grant – To account for the voluminosity of a patent specification, the 
number of claims at the time of the grant is included in the regression. We treat the number of 
                                            
18
  When the lapse and renewal data sources contained conflicting results (0.66% of the cases) information on 
patent lapses were preferred over renewal information. The decision to prefer information on patent lapses 
was suggested by an EPO expert. 
19
  Cf. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/02/data/index.aspx (accessed on April 5, 2007). Since 
Monaco was missing in this database, GDP data were supplemented with data extracted from the United 
Nations Statistics Division (see http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnllist.asp (access on April 5, 2007)). 
GDP data for Monaco were estimated based on the assumption that the level of GDP per capita is 
proportional to that of Luxembourg. 
20
  Cf.  http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/mindist.html (accessed on March 30, 2007). 
21
  Cf.  http://www.epo.org/about-us/epo/member-states.html (accessed on March 30, 2007). 
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claims as a proxy for the overall number of pages that need to be translated, and thus as the 
scale factor in translation costs. Archontopoulos et al (2007) show that there is a strong 
correlation between the number of pages included in a patent and the number of claims it 
contains. 
Citations – It is likely that more relevant patents are validated in more EPC member states. 
We therefore include an additional variable accounting for the potential importance of the 
patent. In particular, we use the number of citations as a rough proxy for a patent’s relevance 
(Gambardella et al. 2008). Since patents that are validated in many countries are more visible 
and may, therefore, also be more frequently cited by patent examiners, we employ the number 
of citations a patent application received within 3 years after publication. The end of this time 
span will usually precede the grant of the patent so that we will avoid endogeneity problems. 
Patent portfolio (5 years) – The number of patents granted to the applicant(s) within 5 years 
before the grant of the focal patent is also used in the probit model. This ‘portfolio size’ 
variable accounts for the resources available to the applicants as well as to proxy their 
patenting experience. 
Translation costs – To validate a patent in a particular country, the document has to be 
translated from one of the EPO’s official three languages (German, French, English) into the 
official language of the target country. These translations are generally provided by foreign 
patent attorneys or translation services. Since we do not have direct measures of translation 
costs, we develop various proxies.22 Irrespective of the country of origin, some target 
countries have languages that are perceived as difficult – or costly - to translate. The 
validation countries were therefore classified into three groups according to the level of 
assumed translation costs. Specifically, translations into Nordic languages and Greek are 
usually more expensive than translations into languages spoken in central or southern Europe. 
The lowest translation costs (if any) arise for countries which have German, English, or 
French as one of their official languages. The following three dummy variables were created: 
• low translation costs:  DE, FR, UK, AT, CH, BE, IE, MC, LU 
• medium translation costs:  ES, PT, NL 
• high translation costs:  SE, DK, FI, GR, CY 
In some cases, translations are not required and translation costs are thus equal to zero – we 
will use these cases as our reference group. A translation does not have to be filed if the 
application and the validation country share a common language, which is the case for 9% of 
                                            
22
 Contrary to our expectations, it proved difficult to find consistent data on translation costs across countries. 
We therefore approximate these costs in terms of country groups and language distances. Cf. van Pottelsberghe 
and Mejer (2008) for an approximation of translation costs requested by 11 European patent attorneys. 
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the country pairs. Similarly, no translation is required for the validation countries which have 
a language similar to the languages of the official proceedings at the EPO. As a first 
approximation for the extent of translation costs, we use the three dummy variables for low, 
medium and high translation costs (relative to the reference group of validations not requiring 
any translations). 
Language distance matrix – The “Dyen Matrix of Linguistic Distances” (Ginsburgh et al. 
2005) is used to generate a more fine-grained measure of translation costs. The matrix is 
based on data collected by Dyen in the 1960s. In particular, Dyen collected words used in 95 
Indo-European languages and dialects (Dyen et al. 1992). These speech varieties were 
classified into ‘cognate classes’. The distance measure was calculated as the percentage 
cognate between language l and language m: 
)1()( 0 lmlm
lm
DYEN
nn
n
ancedistlanguage
+
=  
where lmn is the number of meanings for which l and m were classified as cognate and 
0
lmn  is 
the number of meanings for which l and m were not classified as cognate (Ginsburgh et al. 
2005). Table A.4 in the Appendix summarizes the distance measures. 
Validation fee – corresponds to the fee a patent holder has to pay to validate a granted patent 
in a member state of the EPC. Information on validation fees was extracted from the Official 
Journal and the National Law Relating to the EPC.23 The validation fee may comprise a fixed 
component and a variable (i.e. a page-based) component. However, most of the countries only 
charge a fixed fee. Some countries do not charge validation fees at all (Belgium, Switzerland, 
Luxembourg, Monaco, UK). For the countries which charge a page-based fee (Austria, 
Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Spain) the average number of pages per patent, provided by 
the EPO, was used to compute the average total validation fees.24 Overall, the validation fees 
were calculated according to formula (2): 
)2(SFFF PBFBVB ⋅+=
 
where VBF  denotes the validation fee for destination country B and FBF  the fixed validation 
fee for country B, PBF  refers to a the page-based fee if charged by country B, otherwise PBF is 
zero. S  denotes the average number of pages per patent specification. 
Renewal fees – These fees have also been referred to as maintenance costs, i.e., costs to keep 
a patent valid for an additional year. With few exceptions, renewal fees increase with the year 
                                            
23
  Cf. http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/national-law-epc.html (accessed on August 29, 2007). 
24
  Cf. table A. in the Appendix for a summary of the validation fees charged by different EPC member states. 
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of renewal, but display considerable variation across countries. Renewal fees for the different 
years were again extracted from the “Official Journal and the National Law Relating to the 
EPC”. Since we assume that the fees that have to be paid during the first years after grant 
matter most for the decision to validate a patent in a particular country, cumulative renewal 
fees for the years 4 to 6 from the date of filing of the application at the EPO are included in 
the regression. According to Harhoff and Wagner (2006) the average grant lag at the EPO is 
of about 4 years; and some recent data suggests a slightly longer lag (cf. van Zeebroeck, 
2007b). Harhoff et al. (2007) show that a majority of patents is granted by the EPO at age 4 to 
6. During this three years period, 66.5% of all the patents belonging to a given cohort are 
granted 
Technical areas – Patent applications are classified according to 14 technical areas, known as 
“Joint Clusters” (JCs), used by the EPO since 2004 to assign patent applications to 
examiners.25 As there is some factual and empirical evidence (van Pottelsberghe and van 
Zeebroeck, 2008) showing that some technologies are traditionally subject to a large 
geographical scope of protection (i.e., biotechnology and organic chemistry), whereas others 
are validated in a very limited number of countries, the assigned area of technology may well 
affect the observed geographical scope of protection within the EPC. 
Technology position of validation vs. applicant country – To control for the relative 
technology attractiveness of the validation country, we include a variable that accounts for the 
technology position of the validation country (B) compared to that of the applicant country 
(A) by dividing the number of patents in technology i of the validation country (B) by the 
number of patents in technology i of the applicant country (A) for five years before the grant 
of the patents, i.e. for the years 1998 to 2002. 
)3(
,
iA
iB
BAi patents
patents
positiongytechnolo =  
where i = 1, …, 30 refers to the technical area of the validated patent based on the OECD 
classification (OECD 1994). We expect that this measure will be positively associated with 
validation decisions, since a large production of patents in a particular technology in a 
potential target country is likely to indicate a large market for that technology in that country. 
For example, interviews with patent attorneys suggest that almost all patents on automotive 
technology target Germany as designation because this country constitutes one of the largest 
                                            
25
  EPO Joint Clusters: Industrial Chemistry, Organic Chemistry, Polymers, Biotechnology, Tele-
communications, Audio/Video/Media, Electronics, Electricity/Electrical Machines, Computers, Measuring 
Optics, Handling/Processing, Vehicles/General Technology, Civil Engineering/Thermodynamics, Human 
Necessities. See Archontopoulos et al. (2007) for additional information about the assignment of the IPC 
classes to the EPO joint clusters. 
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markets for automotive product and process technology. That of course is driven by strong 
domestic demand for the product itself. 
  
4 Descriptive Statistics  
The sample consists of 53,904 patents granted by the EPO in 2003. In some of our descriptive 
statistics, we compare the validation targets of these patents to those of the 1995 grant cohort 
(N=40,924). Figure 1 illustrates the share of granted EP patents validated in different EPC 
member states. Whereas 75 to 95 percent of the granted patents are validated in Germany, 
France and the UK, only about 20 to 30% are validated in The Netherlands, Spain, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Austria and Belgium. Smaller countries seem to be the less attractive, 
like for example, Ireland, Monaco, Portugal, or Finland. But one has to take into account that, 
for our sample, these countries were the last to enter the EPC and that these countries have 
experienced a large increase in validations over the last years.26  
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
[Please insert Figure 1 about here] 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Whereas the early members seem to have become less attractive for validation over time, 
more recent member states have become more attractive. However, as the number of patents 
granted by the EPO has constantly increased over the past 20 years, all member states have 
undergone an increase in the absolute number of validations per country over time. 
Figure 2 displays the mean number of validated countries per ‘applicant country’. In 1995 the 
applicants validated their patents on average in five countries, which slightly decreased to 4.9 
in 2003. It is worth noticing that large countries’ validations, or validations of countries which 
are far away from Europe, are concentrated on a smaller number of EPC member states. This 
is especially the case for the U.S., Japan and Korea, which are at the lower end of the 
distribution. Furthermore, the validation behavior of the latter three countries remained almost 
stable over time. U.S. applicants validate their patents in 5 countries on average. Korean and 
Japanese applicants validate in an average of 4 and 3.5 countries, respectively. For these 
countries the high costs associated with translation and validation as well as a large domestic 
market may induce them to be more selective in their European geographical scope.  
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
[Please insert Figure 2 about here] 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                            
26
  Table A.1 in the Appendix gives an overview over the dates of entry of the different member states into the 
EPC. 
 14 
The validation behavior of applicants also appears to vary substantially across technical areas. 
Table 1 illustrates the share of patents granted in 2003 that were finally validated in different 
EPC member states, differentiated by EPO “joint clusters” (which delineate different 
technologies for examination purposes). Whereas all EPC member states are most attractive 
for “organic chemistry” and “biotechnology”, with validation rates considerably above the 
average in almost all EPC member states, validation rates are rather low for “audio, video & 
media” and “computers”. 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 2 summarizes descriptive statistics of the independent variables that are to be used for 
the multivariate analyses. First of all, variables characterizing the applicant and the validation 
countries will be included in the regression. Due to the fact that large non-European countries, 
e.g., the U.S. or  Japan  apply for EP patents but can, of course, not be validation targets, the 
average wealth and size of the application countries is much larger than that of the validated 
countries. The average GDP per capita [in 1000 €] of the applicant countries amounts to 33.0; 
varying from 12.7 (Korea) to 48.8 (Norway). The validation countries have an average GDP 
per capita [in 1000 €] of 34.2 with a minimum at 14.9 (Portugal) and a maximum at 64.54 
(Luxembourg and Monaco). 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
The applicant countries have on average 127.5 mio. inhabitants, the validation countries 
exhibit an average of 19.2 mio. inhabitants. The mean physical distance between the capital 
cities of the applicant and the validation countries amounts to 4,173.2 km. The minimum 
physical distance amounts to 136 km (Belgium – Luxembourg), and the maximum to 
18,044.0 km (Australia – Portugal). The medium technology position of the validation vs. the 
application country amounts to 0.7, varying between 0 (e.g., A: Japan – B: Cyprus in organic 
chemistry) and 2,236 (A: Ireland – B: Germany in mechanical elements). Regarding the 
duration of membership, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and the UK entered into the EPC 25 years earlier (as of 2003), whereas the latest 
entrant, Cyprus, had only been a member of the EPC for 5 years (as of 2003). The average 
number of years of membership was 18.8 in 2003. The patents in the sample received on 
average 0.8 citations (within 3 years after publication of the search report). The number of 3 
years citations varies between 0 and 107. On average 252.1 patents were granted to the 
applicants within 5 years before the grant of the patent in the sample. The size of the 5-year 
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patent portfolio varies between 0 and 2,897. The patents in the sample comprise on average 
12.6 claims at the time of grant, varying between 1 and 247. 
The second group of variables provides information about the fees and costs that have to be 
paid to validate an EPO-granted patent in selected EPC member states and to keep the patent 
in force for the years 4 to 6 from the application date at the EPO. A number of dummy 
variables will be included in the regression to control for the translation costs arising at the 
time of validation. A translation was required for 74% of the total number of observed 
validations. Translations into Nordic languages and Greek are most expensive. Translations 
into Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish are assumed to be less expensive. German, English, and 
French are the least expensive languages. Out of the observed validations, 27% concerned an 
expensive language, 19% a less expensive language, and 28% the group of least expensive 
languages. The Dyen language distance measure exhibits an average language distance of 
0.46 varying between 0 (filing language equals language of the validation country) and 1 
(distance between filing language and Finish). 
Furthermore, Table 2 contains information about validation fees and renewal fees for the 
years 4 to 6 after application at the EPO. The average validation fee amounts to EUR 143.3, 
varying between EUR 0 (Switzerland, Monaco, Belgium, Luxembourg, and UK) and 
EUR 596 (Austria). The cumulative early renewal fees for patents granted in 2003 amount to 
EUR 280 on average and vary between EUR 143 (Luxembourg) and EUR 540 (Switzerland). 
Figure 3 displays renewal and validation fees for patents granted in 2003 categorized by 
translation cost groups. It clearly appears that validating and keeping a patent in force for the 
years 4 to 6 is more expensive in the Nordic countries, especially due to the high translation 
costs but also in Austria due to a high page-based validation fee (Austria charges a page based 
fee of 25 € per page in excess of five pages). 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
[Please insert Figure 3 about here] 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
5 Empirical Implementation and Results 
5.1 Econometric Model 
Since the dependent variable, i.e., the decision to validate a granted patent in a particular 
member state of the EPC is a binary response variable, a probit model is used for the 
 16 
quantitative analysis. The probability of observing a validation of a patent from country A in 
target country B is a function of a number of independent variables:27 
 
 
 
where  
YA, YB =   GDP per capita of the applicant and the validation countries 
NA, NB =   total population of the applicant and the validation countries 
DAB =   physical distance between country A and country B 
FB =   fees (validation or renewal) and translation requirements in country B 
controli =  control variables, e.g., region of the applicant, or joint technological clusters. 
 
We assume that the error terms are independent across different groups of EPO-granted 
patents, but we allow for correlation within groups of different national patents originating 
from the same EPO grant. In order to accommodate the correlation, a cluster regression has 
been used. The cluster estimator leads to the same coefficients as a probit model without 
clustering of error terms, but it adjusts the variance-covariance matrix to account for 
observations for the same patent family to be correlated (Wooldridge 2002).  
 
5.2 Multivariate Results 
The parameters estimated with the probit regressions are displayed in Table 3. Model 3 shows 
that the wealth of the applicant country and the validation country have a significant impact 
on the probability of observing a validation. In particular, an increase in the GDP per capita of 
the applicant country (A) by one logarithmic unit leads to an increase of the probability to 
observe a validation of 7.6%. An increase in the GDP per capita of the target country (B) by 
one unit raises the probability of observing a validation by 25.4%. Both estimators are 
significant at the 1% level.  
The size of the applicant and of the validation countries – as measured by the number of 
inhabitants - also has a positive impact on the probability of a validation. The estimated 
parameters suggest that an increase in the population of the applicant country A by one unit 
increases the probability to observe a validation by 2.3%. An increase of the population 
variable of the validation country by one unit increases the probability of a validation by 
13.5%. Overall, the results in Table 3 show that the wealth and size of the validation countries 
generally have a higher effect than the same characteristics of the applicant countries. 
                                            
27
  A Wald-test was employed to test if a log linear or a linear specification was more appropriate. The results, 
which are available on request, clearly showed that the logarithmic specification was superior.  
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The parameter associated with the age of EPC membership is negative and significant: the 
longer the EPC experience of a country, the lower the likelihood of a validation in that 
country. As expected, the technology position of validation countries in relation to that of the 
application countries has a positive and significant effect on the validation behavior of the 
applicant country. The number of claims also shows a positive and significant parameter: 
larger patents are filed in more countries28. A possible explanation is that patent applicants 
and attorneys devote more efforts on promising filings, and that the number of claims may, 
therefore, be reflective of the patent’s importance.  
The variable capturing the physical distance between the applicant and the validation 
countries has a negative and significant impact on the probability of a validation. The effect 
becomes insignificant after including translation cost dummies in the regression (which 
actually correlates with the geographical distance). 
Model 3 includes the dummy variables indicating whether the costs for a translation are high, 
medium or low, or whether no translation was needed (reference group). The estimated 
parameters show that the impact of translations is negative compared to the reference group 
(no translation needed). In particular, when the translation costs are low, the validation 
probability decreases by 15%. Medium translation costs decrease the probability of a 
validation by 24% and high translation costs by 21% (each compared to the reference group). 
Model 3 also shows the role of the geographical origin of the applicants. The probability of a 
validation is the lowest for the applicants originating from Japan and other non-European 
countries, and is the highest for applicants based in Europe. These results are again in line 
with the results shown in Figure 2 and with the findings of Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 
(2001) that large countries are less dependent on internationalization, since they already profit 
from large domestic markets.  
Model 3 further contains variables measuring the value of the applications (forward patent 
citations) and the portfolio size of the applicant, as proxied with the number of patents granted 
to the applicants within 5 years before the grant of the underlying patents. Validations are 
more likely to occur for more valuable patent applications. In particular, a 1% increase in the 
value of a patent, i.e. a higher number of 3-years citations, increases the probability of a 
validation by 3%. However, a 1% larger 5-year patent portfolio of the applicants decreases the 
likelihood of a validation by 1.2%. In other words, patents of larger firms or of firms that hold 
more patents are characterized by a more focused geographical scope of protection. The firms 
with a larger patent portfolio are characterized by a more selective market coverage. 
                                            
28
 Van Zeebroeck and van Pottelsberghe (2008) show that the number of claims included in a patent correlates 
with many patent value indicators, including family size. 
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-------------------------------------------------------------- 
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Model 3 also measures the impact of validation fees and renewal fees on the validation 
behaviour of applicants.29 Renewal fees reduce the probability of observing a validation in a 
country. A 1% increase in the renewal fees would lead to a reduction in the probability of 
validation of about 12.6%. An increase in the validation fees by 1% leads to a decrease in the 
validation probability of 5.3%. Finally, it should be mentioned that the renewal fees have one 
of the highest z-statistics, indicating a high precision of the estimates.  
Model 4 includes the Dyen language distance measure, which forms an alternative and 
potentially more accurate proxy for translation costs. The results reveal that an increase of the 
Dyen language distance by 1% decreases the probability of a validation by 15.9%. Model 4 
also includes an interaction term “Dyen language distance * no. of claims at grant” to account 
for the voluminosity of the validated patents. In particular, the number of pages of a patent, 
which is highly correlated with the number of claims also affects translation costs. The effect 
of language distances on the validation behaviour is still negative and significant, and the 
number of claims has a positive impact. The interaction term is negative and significant which 
suggest that larger patents are less likely to be validated in countries with high translation 
costs.  
EPO industry clusters dummies were used in all models as control variables. A Wald test 
conducted for each model reveals that the technical areas have a significant impact on the 
validation behavior of applicants. Overall, results are consistent with the findings displayed in 
Table 1, i.e. organic chemistry and biotechnology exhibit the largest impact on the probability 
to observe a validation (the parameters associated with industry clusters,  estimated in  Model 
5, are shown in Table A.5 in the Appendix). These findings are consistent with the scope-year 
index put forward in van Pottelsberghe and van Zeebroeck (2008): patents in biotech and 
organic chemistry are validated in more countries and enforced longer than the patents filed in 
other technologies.  
                                            
29  As a robustness check, we compared the determinants of validations over two grant years (2003 and 1995). 
To make a comparison of the two grant years reasonable, the two samples were built symmetrically with 
respect to potential validation countries. In particular, later entrants into the EPC (i.e. FI and CY) were 
excluded from the 2003 sample. Results are consistent with respect to the geographical context, languages, 
costs and fees. The only differences are that the wealth of the applicant country has a significantly negative 
effect on validations for the grant year 1995, whereas the effect is positive in 2003. A possible explanation 
of this difference may be that in recent years small applicant countries with a relatively low GDP per capita 
(e.g., ES, BE, and AT) validated more countries per granted EP patent (see Figure 2). Consistently, the 
distance between the capital cities of the applicant and the validation country has a negative impact. The 
coefficient decreases slightly from 1995 to 2003. Possibly, distances become less important over time, e.g., 
due to the internet and advancement of communication technologies. The complete results are available 
upon request. 
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Overall, the results support hypotheses H.1a and H.1b as well as H.2a and H.2b. The size and 
the wealth of applicant and of the validation countries positively affect the propensity of 
applicants to validate patents abroad. Hypotheses H.3a, H.3b and H.3c are also confirmed by 
our estimates: transaction costs (i.e. validation costs, renewal fees and translation costs) have 
a strong and statistically significant influence on firms’ decision to validate a patent abroad. 
5.3 Policy Simulation of the Impact of the “London Protocol” 
The London Protocol (or London Agreement) makes use of Article 65 EPC which foresees an 
option to reduce costs relating to the translation requirements of European patents. The 
agreement was concluded at the Intergovernmental Conference in London on October 17th 
2000.30 The cost-reducing effect comes about as the EPC contracting states which have 
ratified or acceded to the Agreement waive, entirely or largely, the requirement for 
translations of European patents. Under Article 1(1), (2) and (3) of the London Agreement, all 
states which have an official language in common with one of the three official languages of 
the EPO shall drop the translation requirements provided for in Article 65(1) EPC, except for 
the claims section. Those states which do not have an official language in common with one 
of the EPO’s official languages also drop the translation requirement of the description part of 
the patent, but require a translation of the claims into one of their official languages. On May 
1st, 2008, the London Protocol came into force in 14 EPC member states31. In November 2008 
the London Protocol was signed (but is still to be ratified) in Belgium. Ten of these 15 
member states are represented in our sample: Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, France, the 
UK, Luxembourg, Monaco, The Netherlands, Sweden, and Belgium.  
We use the parameters estimated in Model 5 (containing the translation dummies and the 
Dyen language distance measure, each interacted with the number of claims at grant to 
account for the voluminosity of the patents) to estimate the impact of the London Protocol on 
validation behavior. To obtain our simulation results, we first simulate the costs of translation 
as foreseen by the London Protocol by switching the respective translation dummies and the 
Dyen measure to zero. We then predict the likelihood of validation using the estimated 
coefficients of Model 5. The results of these simulations are tabulated in Table 4. 
When interpreting the results, one has to take into account that our estimates are likely to 
yield upper bounds of the actual effect. This is the case for two reasons: first, claims will still 
have to be translated into the respective language, and second, our language variables may 
                                            
30
 See Official Journal EPO 2001, 549ff. http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/pubs/oj001/12_01/ 
12_5491.pdf, accessed on December 28, 2008. 
31
   As of May 1st, 2008 the London Protocol was enforced in Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Latvia,  Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, The Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK 
(see http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/london-agreement/status.html, accessed on June 22, 2008). 
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capture to some degree variation that is related to missing variables. We have tried to 
minimize the second effect by taking into account a number of variables which affect the cost 
of doing business in the target country, but these controls may not be perfect. Despite these 
caveats, our results should be of interest to policy-makers. First, results in Table 4 correspond 
to the legal situation after May 1st, 2008, i.e., after the London Protocol came into force in the 
ten EPC member states mentioned above (columns 3 and 6 of Table 4). Afterwards, we show 
changes in the number of validations if the London Protocol were ratified by all EPC member 
states represented in our sample (columns 4 and 7 of Table 4). 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
[Please insert Table 4 about here] 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 4 suggests that those countries that put the London Protocol into national law after May 
1st, 2008 will experience a substantial increase in the probability of validation. The largest 
absolute increase can be expected for the Netherlands (19,162) and Sweden (13,840). Overall, 
we predict that, for those countries that ratified the London Protocol, national patent 
validations may increase by as much as 29% (75,053 additional validated patents) due to the 
cost reductions resulting from the reduction of translation requirements.32  
Assuming that all countries signed the London Protocol leads to a further increase in the 
predicted probability of validation for all countries (column 4) except for Monaco and 
Luxembourg. The highest increase in the number of national patents can be observed in Spain 
(21,292) and the Netherlands (19,162). Overall, we estimate that the absolute number of 
additional validated patents may amount to as many as 153,832, which would be equivalent to 
a relative increase of 59.3%. Of course, these estimates can merely give a rough indication 
and represent upper-bound figures of additional validations. On the other hand, they do not 
take into account the fact that the overall costs of patenting will decrease as well due to the 
London Protocol which may induce an increase in patent filings. 
 
6 Concluding Remarks 
The European patent system provides an interesting field for the empirical analysis of patent 
systems. The variation in our data allows us to investigate to what extent patent applicants are 
influenced by both the fees and translation costs, as well as by physical distances and market 
attractiveness (represented by its size, its wealth or the technical position of the validation 
country relative to the applicant country). Our paper analyzes a particularly clear decision-
                                            
32
 Although Monaco and Luxembourg also ratified the London Protocol, Table 4 (column 6) does not show a 
change in the number of national patent validations for these countries. This is not surprising, since these two 
countries had not required translations for validations even before the London Protocol came into force.  
 21 
making situation where fees and translation costs are the only remaining expenses that 
separate applicants from patent protection. The empirical results are applied to assess the 
impact of an important patent policy reform, the London Protocol, which has had a major 
impact on the translation costs of European patents.  
The empirical analysis essentially aimed at testing the role of languages (i.e., translation 
costs) and the role of fees for validation and early renewal. A patent-level probit model was 
used estimate the incidence of patent validation of an EPO-granted patent in a given EPC 
country. Economic variables such as the size and the wealth of the countries of origin (the 
country of residence of the applicant) and of the countries of destination where the patent is 
validated are important determinants of the validation probability. In general, the 
characteristics of the validation country (where the patent is validated and enforced) have a 
much stronger impact on validations than the characteristics of the origin  country.  
Technological specificities and geographical distance were included as additional explanatory 
variables. These characteristics are important factors affecting the probability of validation of 
a patent in a given country. The world may have become more globalized, but it certainly has 
not become “completely flat”. Physical distance still matters, and so does the distance in 
culture and languages. The empirical analysis also shows that translation costs have a 
negative impact on validations. Furthermore, our results show that early renewal fees and 
validation fees substantially reduce the likelihood of validating a patent in a given country.  
The unique and rich dataset which exploits the institutional detail of the European patent 
system also permits us to make predictions regarding the number of additional validations that 
EPC member states may expect in the future. A simulation of the validation decision under 
London Protocol translation regulation shows that the countries that ratified the London 
Protocol face an increasing probability of validations. In particular, we predict that the 
number of additional validated patents will increase between 29%. Should all EPC member 
state ratify the London Protocol, the increase could reach 59.3% of the validations performed 
in 2003. Our estimates only capture the impact of the marginal cost of patenting on validation. 
It is highly likely that the cost reduction coming with the implementation of the London 
Protocol will affect the overall  number of filings at the EPO, and hence the number of grants 
which are then subject to the validation decision studied here.33 We plan to investigate the 
                                            
33
 According to the initial simulations performed by van Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2008) the total number of 
patent applications could increase by nearly 30% thanks to the reduction in translation costs. However the 
current economic crisis will evidently overshadow the cost effect and lead to a fall in the number of patent 
applications. 
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overall impact of current reforms and reform proposals in future work building on the 
econometric results described in this paper. 
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Figure 1: Share of granted EP patents validated in EPC contracting states (by grant  
year), N1995 = 40,924, N2003 = 53,90434 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Average number of validations per granted EP patent (by grant year and by 
applicant country), N1995 = 40,924; N2003 = 53,904 
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  The abbreviations of the countries are defined in Table A.3 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 3: Average costs (validation fees and renewal fees) to be paid to validate a patent  
 in a particular member state of the EPC and to keep it in force for the years 4 to 
6  (patents granted in 2003). 
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Table 1:  Share of granted EP patents validated in each EPC contracting states (by joint 
technical clusters), grant year = 2003, N2003 = 53,904 
 
 DE FR GB NL SE CH BE AT LU ES DK GR IE MC PT FI CY 
Industrial Chemistry 0.93 0.79 0.74 0.36 0.24 0.30 0.33 0.25 0.11 0.30 0.13 0.07 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.02 
Organic Chemistry 0.95 0.89 0.81 0.52 0.35 0.53 0.52 0.39 0.25 0.54 0.32 0.27 0.40 0.27 0.28 0.24 0.10 
Polymers 0.96 0.83 0.78 0.38 0.20 0.23 0.32 0.18 0.08 0.32 0.10 0.05 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.01 
Biotechnology 0.95 0.89 0.86 0.50 0.42 0.60 0.51 0.44 0.33 0.50 0.38 0.30 0.47 0.32 0.31 0.26 0.11 
Telecommunications 0.91 0.78 0.79 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.00 
Audio/Video/Media 0.92 0.79 0.85 0.18 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.00 
Electronics 0.90 0.77 0.78 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.01 
Electricity & 
Electrical Machnies 0.93 0.76 0.70 0.20 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.12 0.05 0.15 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.00 
Computers 0.90 0.77 0.85 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.01 
Measuring Optics 0.92 0.77 0.77 0.20 0.14 0.25 0.14 0.13 0.06 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.01 
Handling & 
Processing 0.94 0.74 0.64 0.26 0.24 0.36 0.28 0.28 0.10 0.34 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.02 
Vehicles & General 
Technology 0.93 0.77 0.65 0.16 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.05 0.27 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.01 
Civil Engineering / 
Thermodynamics 0.90 0.72 0.64 0.26 0.18 0.27 0.22 0.23 0.08 0.25 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.01 
Human Necessities 0.94 0.80 0.71 0.30 0.21 0.33 0.26 0.23 0.10 0.29 0.13 0.08 0.18 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.02 
 
Table 2:  Descriptive statistics (N = 862,549 country pairs)  
 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
GDP per capita: applicant country [1000 US$] 32.99 4.84 12.71 48.78 
GDP per capita: validation country [1000 US$] 34.21 14.02 14.89 64.54 
Population: applicant country [mio.] 127.52 101.87 3.98 291.00 
Population: validation country [mio.] 19.21 23.65 0.03 82.52 
Years membership EPC (validation country) 18.78 7.00 5 25 
Physical distance between capital cities [km] 4173.17 3565.92 136 18044 
Technology position applicant vs. validation country 0.70 6.44 0 2236 
Origin of the applicant (0/1)   
Europe 0.54   0 1 
US applicant 0.26   0 1 
Japanese applicant 0.17   0 1 
Other non-Europe 0.03   0 1 
No. of claims at grant 12.57 9.07 1 247 
Citations 0.84 1.69 0 107 
Patent portfolio (5 years) 252.10 551.77 0 2897 
Translation costs (0/1)   
Translation not required 0.26   0 1 
High translation costs 0.27   0 1 
Medium translation costs 0.19   0 1 
Low translation costs 0.28   0 1 
Language distance matrix (Dyen) 0.46 0.33 0 1 
Validation fees [€] 143.29 171.00 0 596.25 
Renewal fees for years 4 to 6 [€] 280.07 140.06 143 540 
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Table 3: Multivariate analysis of patent validations for 2003 (marginal effects from robust 
probit regression, standard errors adjusted for intra-group correlation); 
N = 862,549 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Dependent variable  Validation (0/1) 
Geographical context           
GDP per capita of applicant  0.161*** 0.138*** 0.076*** 0.099*** 0.068*** 
   country (log) [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] 
GDP per capita of validation  0.266*** 0.450*** 0.254*** 0.373*** 0.242*** 
   country (log) [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Population of applicant country (log) 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.023*** 0.033*** 0.022*** 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Population of validation country (log) 0.116*** 0.143*** 0.135*** 0.147*** 0.135*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Costs of business in the target country         
Years membership EPC of the  0.041*** -0.033*** -0.007*** -0.056*** -0.022*** 
   validation country (log) [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
Physical distance between capital  -0.020*** -0.029*** -0.0005     -0.012*** -0.001 
   cities (log) [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Technology position of validation vs.  0.151*** 0.146*** 0.112*** 0.145*** 0.111*** 
   applicant country (log) [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
USA (0/1) -0.070*** -0.048*** -0.071*** -0.066*** -0.068*** 
  [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Japan (0/1) -0.094*** -0.078*** -0.125*** -0.106*** -0.123*** 
  [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Other non-Europe (0/1) -0.067*** -0.054*** -0.107*** -0.098*** -0.109*** 
  [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Translation costs dummies - reference group: no translation needed     
low translation costs (0/1)     -0.151***   -0.113*** 
      [0.001]   [0.002] 
Medium translation costs (0/1)     -0.243***   -0.223*** 
      [0.002]   [0.002] 
High translation costs (0/1)     -0.221***   -0.189*** 
      [0.002]   [0.002] 
Translation costs – DYEN distance matrix       
Language distance (DYEN matrix)       -0.159*** -0.045*** 
           [0.007] [0.007] 
Language distance (DYEN matrix)       -0.015*** -0.015*** 
    * claims at grant (log)       [0.003] [0.003] 
Other patent characteristics           
Number of claims at grant (log) 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Citations (log) 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Patent portfolio (5 years) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
   (5 years) (log) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Validation fees and renewal Fees           
Validation fees (log)   -0.014*** -0.053*** -0.023*** -0.052*** 
    [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Renewal fees for years 4 to 6 (log)   -0.187*** -0.126*** -0.191*** -0.137*** 
    [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
Control variables           
EPO Industry Clusters (Wald test);  chi2(13)= chi2(13)= chi2(13)= chi2(13)= chi2(13)= 
Reference group: Vehicles/General  5,729.37 5,809.84 5,900.49 5,850.82 5,910.11 
   Technology (0/1) p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.231 0.254 0.274 0.262 0.274 
log-likelihood -397,111.4 -385,132.6 -374,943.1 -381,124.4 -374,676.7 
Robust standard errors in brackets / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4: Simulation of Validation Decisions under London Protocol Translation Rules 
(based on Model 5) 
 
Country 
Share of 
patents 
validated 
(before 
London 
Protocol) 
Predicted 
probability of 
validation under 
London Protocol  
(as of May 1st, 
2008) 
Predicted 
probability of 
validation 
under London 
Protocol 
(all countries 
signed) 
Actual 
validations 
in 2003 
Predicted 
additional 
validations 
in 2003 
(London 
Protocol as 
of May 1st, 
2008) 
Predicted 
additional 
validations 
in 2003 
(London 
Protocol 
signed by 
all EPC 
countries) 
Austria 0.25 0.25 0.36  13,307  0  5,855 
Belgium 0.29 0.46 0.46  15,436  9,049  9,049 
Switzerland 0.27 0.36 0.36  14,372  4,791  4,791 
Cyprus 0.02 0.02 0.11  1,065  0  4,791 
Germany 0.76 0.87 0.87  40,454  5,855  5,855 
Denmark 0.16 0.39 0.39  8,517  12,24_3  12,243 
Spain 0.30 0.30 0.70  15,969  0  21,292 
Finland 0.09 0.09 0.33  4,791  0  12,775 
France 0.77 0.90 0.90  40,986  6,920  6,920 
UK 0.71 0.77 0.77  37,793  3,194  3,194 
Greece 0.11 0.11 0.36  5,855  0  13,307 
Ireland 0.30 0.30 0.37  15,969  0  3,726 
Luxembourg 0.22 0.22 0.22  11,710  0  0 
Monaco 0.04 0.04 0.04  2,129  0  0 
Netherlands 0.27 0.63 0.63  14,372  19,162  19,162 
Portugal 0.11 0.11 0.43  5,855  0  17,033 
Sweden 0.20 0.46 0.46  10,646  13,840  13,840 
TOTAL  
(%)    
259,225 
100% 
 75,053 
 29.0% 
 153,832 
 59.3% 

 Countries in which the London Protocol came into force after May 1st, 2008. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 
Members of the EPC as of January 2009 
 
Date of entry into 
the EPC Country 
Date of entry into 
the EPC Country 
Oct 7, 1977 Belgium, Germany, France, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom 
Nov 1, 2000 Turkey 
May 1, 1978 Sweden Jul 1, 2002 Bulgaria, Czech Republ.,  
Estonia, Slovakia 
Dec 1, 1978 Italy Dec 1, 2002 Slovenia 
May 1, 1979 Austria Jan 1, 2003 Hungary  
Apr 1, 1980 Liechtenstein Mar 1, 2003 Romania  
Oct 1, 1986 Greece, Spain Mar 1, 2004 Poland  
Jan 1, 1990 Denmark Nov 1, 2004 Iceland 
Dec 1, 1991 Monaco  Dec 1, 2004 Lithuania  
Jan 1, 1992 Portugal Jul 1, 2005 Latvia  
Aug 1, 1992 Ireland  Mar 1, 2007 Malta 
Mar 1, 1996 Finland Jan 1, 2008 Norway, Croatia 
Apr 1, 1998 Cyprus  Jan 1, 2009 Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia  
 
 
Table A.2 
Validation fees, early renewal fees and translation costs for the year 2003 
 
 
country 
validation fee  
[Euro]♣ 
renewal fee 
[Euro]♣ translation 
costs 
[dummy] 
    fix      page-based (pages free)   year 4   year 5  year 6 
Austria 116 25 (5) 94 101 138 low 
Belgium 0 - 45 60 75 low 
Switzerland 0 - 0 270 270 low 
Cyprus 87 - 52 70 87 low 
Germany 150 - 70 90 130 low 
Denmark 148 11 (35) 148 169 189 high 
Spain 245 10 (22) 25 48 71 medium 
Finland 85 10 (4) 125 140 165 high 
France 35 - 25 25 135 low 
United Kingdom 0 - 0 72 101 low 
Greece 299 - 46 54 70 medium 
Ireland 35 - 90 114 134 low 
Luxembourg 0 - 37 47 59 low 
Monaco 0 - 31 50 70 low 
The Netherlands 25 - 0 242 279 medium 
Portugal 91 - 41 53 59 medium 
Sweden 120 17 (8) 76 98 120 high 
♣ Source: Official Journal and the National Law Relating to the EPC; exchange rates: CA/D 1/03 
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Table A.3 
Country Abbreviations 
 
 
Country Abbreviation Country Abbreviation 
Austria AT Ireland IE 
Australia AU Israel IL 
Belgium BE Italy IT 
Canada CA Japan JP 
Switzerland CH Korea KR 
Cyprus CY Luxembourg LU 
Germany DE Monaco MC 
Greece GR The Netherlands NL 
Denmark DK Norway NO 
Spain ES Portugal PT 
Finland FI Sweden SE 
France FR The USA US 
United Kingdom UK   
 
 
 
Table A.4 
Dyen Matrix of Linguistic Differences (Ginsburgh et al. 2005) 
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Table A.5 
Multivariate analysis of patent validations for 2003 (marginal effects from robust probit 
regression, standard errors adjusted for intra-group correlation) 
Coefficients of the Technical Joint Clusters (Model 5) N = 862,549 
 
  Model 5 
Dependent variable  Validation (0/1) 
EPO Industry Clusters; reference group:  
Vehicles & General Technology   
Industrial Chemistry 0.110*** 
  [0.006] 
Organic Chemistry 0.317*** 
  [0.006] 
Polymers 0.119*** 
  [0.005] 
Biotechnology 0.349*** 
  [0.007] 
Telecommunications 0.007 
  [0.006] 
Audio/Video/Media 0.021*** 
  [0.006] 
Electronics 0.017*** 
  [0.005] 
Electricity & Electrical Machines 0.017*** 
  [0.005] 
Computers 0.014** 
  [0.007] 
Measuring Optics 0.024*** 
  [0.005] 
Handling & Processing 0.075*** 
  [0.005] 
Civil Engineering / Thermodynamics 0.024*** 
  [0.005] 
Human Necessities 0.083*** 
  [0.005] 
Pseudo R2 0.274 
Robust standard errors in brackets  
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A.6 
Renewal Fees by Country and Renewal Year - 2008 [EURO] 
 
 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 
AT 70 150 150 150 270 270 270 500 500 500 850 850 850 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 
BE 35 50 65 85 100 125 145 170 195 220 250 290 330 370 410 455 500 545 
CY 42.7 51.3 68.3 85.4 102.5 119.6 136.7 153.8 170.9 205.0 239.2 273.4 307.6 358.8 410.1 461.3 512.6 563.8 
DK 67.3 148.1 168.3 188.5 215.4 242.4 276.0 309.7 343.3 377.0 410.7 444.3 484.7 525.1 565.5 605.9 646.3 686.7 
FI 170 140 155 180 225 265 295 335 390 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 800 850 
FR 36 36 36 72 92 130 170 210 250 290 330 380 430 490 550 620 690 760 
DE 70 70 90 130 280 340 290 350 470 620 760 910 1060 1230 1410 1590 1760 1940 
GR 0 0 54 70 84 98 114 134 154 184 214 242 272 322 358 392 430 472 
IE 60 90 114 134 150 176 194 220 242 265 285 311 335 356 382 408 438 468 
LU 29 37 47 59 74 89 104 118 130 145 160 175 190 205 220 235 250 270 
MC 32 35 55 75 90 105 120 135 165 195 225 260 290 300 310 315 335 355 
NL 0 40 100 160 220 280 340 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 
PT 43.5 52.7 64.1 84.7 98.4 114.5 137.4 171.7 201.5 228.9 274.7 320.5 366.3 412.1 457.9 503.7 549.5 595.2 
ES 22.2 27.7 53.0 78.2 103.3 128.6 153.8 179.0 216.9 254.7 292.4 330.4 368.2 419.7 469.1 519.6 570.0 620.4 
SE 36.3 72.6 93.4 114.1 140.1 166.0 197.1 233.5 259.4 280.2 295.7 316.5 342.4 368.3 394.3 420.2 446.2 466.9 
CH 0 0 65.4 65.4 130.7 130.7 202.6 202.6 202.6 202.6 202.6 202.6 202.6 202.6 202.7 202.6 202.6 202.6 
UK 0 0 67.0 93.8 120.6 147.4 174.2 201.0 227.8 254.6 281.4 308.2 335.0 361.8 402.0 442.2 482.4 536.0 
IT 0 0 60 90 120 170 200 230 310 410 530 600 650 650 650 650 650 650 
♣ Source: http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/natlaw/en/vi/index.htm 
 
 
